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Vittorio Villa
A Pragmatically Oriented heory  
of Legal Interpretation
Based on a dynamic approach to the understanding of meaning, the author develops 
what he calls a pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation. his theory dif-
fers both from formalistic and anti-formalistic approaches to legal interpretation, for 
interpretation is, according to the author, at the same time a discovery of some levels of 
meaning and a construction of other levels of meaning. Meaning is thus understood as a 
gradual entity, which forms at various levels. It implies both the inter-linguistic dimen-
sion (i.e. sense) and the language-world relation (i.e. reference). It is never produced 
all at once, but is rather formed progressively, that is, step by step. In this, the context 
is essential. he context is only provided in a concrete (real or paradigmatic) case for 
which we are to interpret a certain legal disposition. For that reason, it is a judge as the 
interpreter of the text who (besides the author of the text) necessarily contributes to the 
inal deinition of its meaning. he article is published in the English original and in its 
Slovenian translation by Tilen Štajnpihler.
Key words: legal interpretation; formalist, anti-formalist, eclectic, and pragmatically 
oriented theory of legal interpretation; static and dynamic theory of 
meaning; sense, reference, context
1 THE CENTRAL ROLE OF INTERPRETATION  
IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THEORIES
Interpretation is at the centre of attention today, much more than in the 
past, in the most signiicant trends of contemporary legal theory (for instance, 
in analytical legal theory and in legal hermeneutics). It is true that it has always 
been considered a necessary and prejudicial element for carrying out the “or-
dinary” activities of judges and jurists; in traditional legal theories, neverthe-
less, interpretation was considered by and large a “sector topic”, though one 
of decisive importance. If, for instance, we consider the work of Kelsen, cer-
tainly the main exponent of the normativist current of legal positivism in the 
last century, we see that in his main work legal interpretation is discussed in 
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the last chapter1, and hence ater that all the basic problems for Kelsen’s legal 
theory have been dealt with and resolved: problems, that is to say, linked to 
identiication and attribution of validity to legal norms inside a system that 
encompasses them in a unitary way. For Kelsen, in short, interpretation begins 
to work upon norms whose existence has already been veriied, independently 
of interpretation (in the light of the category of validity); thus for Kelsen inter-
pretation does not participate in the process through which legal norms come 
into being.  
Today, instead, some of the most signiicant works in legal theory are de-
veloped precisely as theories of interpretation, and have this focal point as 
their central theme. his is the case, for instance, of Dworkin’s theory2 and 
MacCormick’s theory3. In these works, interpretation is no longer one of the 
conclusive parts, though a necessary one, of a legal theory that has already been 
developed examining other notions, considered as prejudicial, but on the con-
trary logically constitutes a priority element in relation to the others. It should 
be noticed that it is not a quantitative aspect; just as Viola and Zaccaria say4, 
what happens is not so much that the chapter of interpretation becomes bigger 
but that the theory of interpretation becomes fundamental for the description 
of law itself. he study of interpretation, in other words, comes into play pre-
cisely when the issue of the existence of law and its validity has to be faced.
I would now like to point out some of the reasons justifying this diferent 
role that interpretation plays in contemporary legal theories. hree basic rea-
sons will be pointed out, the irst of a legal-philosophical character, the second of 
an institutional character, and the third of a theoretical character.
he irst reason, of a legal-philosophical character, is linked to the spread, 
both in analytical and in hermeneutical trends, of a legal conception that can 
appropriately be labelled as “theory of law as a social practice.” he “theory of 
law as a social practice” is a conception that is strongly critical of the objectivis-
tic conception, dominant until the 1960s. In this connection, according to the 
former, legal rules do not represent objective data (whether normative or fac-
tual) that are available to description and logically exist in an autonomous way 
in relation to the various activities (interpretation, use, application) which will 
aterwards make reference to them; by contrast, for the approach that looks at 
law as a social practice legal rules exist, in a strict sense, only insofar as they are 
1 See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Wien, Franz Deuticke, 1960; Ital. translation La dottrina 
pura del diritto, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, ch. VIII. 
2 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, London, Fontana Press, 1986; Ital. translation L’impero del 
diritto, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1989.
3 See Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal heory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; Ital. 
translation Ragionamento giuridico e teoria del diritto, Torino, Giappichelli, 2001.
4 Francesco Viola and Giuseppe Zaccaria, Diritto e interpretazione. Lineamenti di teoria erme-
neutica del diritto, Bari, Laterza, 1999, v.
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part of a normative social practice, that is to say insofar as they are interpreted, 
used, applied, mentioned, considered as the basis for criticisms and justiica-
tions, and so forth, by the members of a community of rule followers5, many of 
whom adopt the internal point of view6 (a “critical-relexive” attitude towards 
rules that are accepted as such).
he second reason is that of an institutional character. I use this expression 
to highlight the fact that this reason is linked to the present-day conformation 
of our institutions, and that is to say of that legal system, today prevalent in 
western countries, that we call a constitutional legal state. From this point of 
view, it can be noticed that the presence of this new institutional model chal-
lenges the traditional notion, one of a formal character, of legal validity. Today 
we are more and more convinced that elements linked to content are part of 
the characterization of this notion; and here legal interpretation plays an im-
portant role, and precisely in the process of checking the material validity of 
a legal norm. Indeed, it is through interpretation (both of the constitutional 
principles involved and of the norms whose constitutional legitimacy is being 
debated) that it is possible to verify the conformity or not of the content of the 
legislative norm to the constitutional principle. But, it must be stressed, say-
ing this amounts to maintaining that interpretation is a decisive element of the 
process through which norms take on normative existence, acquiring, precisely, 
the property of validity; a property that, as the most recent theories suggest, is 
acquired in a dynamic way, and no longer “all at once”7. 
he third reason has a more speciically theoretical character and concerns 
the major difusion of the thesis that distinguishes between legal sentences and 
legal norms. From this point of view, it is maintained that meaning does not 
magically belong to the sentences from which interpretation starts, but is the 
result of the interpretative activity that has the norm as its result; and hence 
norms, in all those cases in which they are incorporated in sentences expressly 
formulated by the legislator, constitute possible meanings of legislative disposi-
tions8.
If this basic theoretical assumption is shared, then recognition of the fun-
damental importance of interpretation is blended with the attribution of an in-
alienable productive and creative role to interpretative activity directly carried 
5 See on this my book Vittorio Villa, Il positivismo giuridico. Metodi, teorie e giudizi di valore, 
Torino, Giappichelli, 2004, 79–82, 146–152, 196–197.
6 his famous notion has been of course introduced by  Herbert L. A. Hart, he Concept of Law 
(1961), Second Edition with a Postscript, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994; it. transl. Il concetto 
di diritto, Torino, Einaudi, 2002, pp. 67–70, 105–108.  
7 See, for this dynamic theory of legal validity, Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del ga-
rantismo penale, Bari, Laterza, 1989, 97, 348–349, 476, 916.
8 Giovanni Tarello has been the irst to develop this thesis, now widely accepted inside  analyti-
cal trends. See Giovanni Tarello, L’interpretazione della legge, Milano, Giufrè, 1980, 9–10. 
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out by jurisprudence (and indirectly by doctrine). he central idea here is that 
the judges are called on to cooperate with the legislator in preparing normative 
messages to send out to citizens, and precisely because such messages are not 
complete without the interpretative intervention of jurisprudence. Hence, from 
this point of view, legal interpretation has a not eliminable creative function of 
its own.
Well, if we speciically look at the work of judges in the speciic Italian insti-
tutional context (which constitutes the privileged ield of reference of my analy-
sis), we can notice that today the degree of creativeness of judicial interpreta-
tion has enormously increased, for a series of diferent reasons, three of which I 
am interested in highlighting.
he irst reason is linked to the alluvial production of new law, through the 
emanation, particularly in private law, of “special laws”, unshackled by unitary 
reference to the system of our civil code and of its principles, which has con-
cerned our legal organization since the 1960s. One thinks for example of the 
“statuto dei lavoratori”, the reform of family law, laws on rents and agrarian con-
tracts, the introduction of divorce, and so forth. 
he second reason is linked to the intensiication, among judges, of interpre-
tative attitudes that are avowedly anti-formalist. hese attitudes – particularly 
widespread at the end of the 1960s (with the judicial “activism” of the so-called 
“magistrati d’assalto”), and then, in the early 90s, with “Tangentopoli” (which 
began in 1992) – are also expressed through the use of interpretative strategies 
that are much more concerned to enact “justice in the concrete case” than to 
ind the inspiring reason for decisions in the ratio legis. his means that the 
interpretative techniques used each time are oten considered as rules of ex post 
justiication of decisions already taken, rather than as guiding rules for the deci-
sions themselves. 
he third reason is linked to the emergence in our legal culture, begin-
ning from the 1960s, of the process that Riccardo Guastini appropriately calls 
costituzionalizzazione of a legal system9. his is a process of transformation 
of our system, at the end of which it can be said that it proves to be totally 
“impregnated” by constitutional norms. It must be clariied that this cultural 
process does not so much concern the presence of the constitution in itself, but 
rather the understanding of it on the part of legal culture, and above all of ju-
rists and operators. his way of seeing and interpreting the constitution hinges 
on the conviction of its “pervasiveness” and its “capacity to inluence” directly 
every aspect of the life of a legal system. Well, this process determines a sort of 
over-interpretation of the constitution, that is to say that interpretative attitude 
through which the decision is taken to give the constitutional text an extensive 
9 Riccardo Guastini, La “costituzionalizzazione” dell’ordinamento italiano, Ragion Pratica 
(1998) 11, 185–206.
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interpretation. An extensive interpretation works in such a way as to derive from 
the existing constitutional norms, possibly with the use of analogical argument, 
a vast series of implicit norms, able to discipline any type of “constitutionally 
signiicant” behaviour.
It must be added that for many jurists (but also for public opinion) this in-
crease in the “degree of judicial creativeness” constitutes a very worrying ele-
ment. he fact is that though it is oten not the result of a free choice by the 
judge but the “necessary” outcome of the attitude that today our institutional 
order takes; however, it could constitute a danger for our democratic institu-
tions, because in actual fact it involves the possibility that the judge too, as well 
as the legislator, may become a “creator of new law” (though in an “interstitial” 
way). Behaving in this way, the judge not only endangers the fundamental prin-
ciple of law certainty, but potentially also challenges the basis of our democratic 
order: the principle of the separation of powers, as a result of which only the leg-
islator would be the depositary of the power to produce new law.
his whole series of vicissitudes places the theme of legal interpretation even 
more at the centre of attention. Certainly, the task of a theory of legal interpre-
tation cannot be that of ofering concrete remedies to this state of afairs, al-
though, in our ield, as in all human sciences, theoretical relections have some 
efects on the phenomena studied and have normative implications for all the 
participants in these practices; but it can certainly be that of providing, for in-
stance, an adequate reconstructive analysis of this activity, so as to see whether 
it really exposes our legal organization to such major risks. Well, my objective, 
in this essay, is precisely to show how judicial interpretation, once it is correct-
ly interpreted and practised, does not constitute a danger for our democratic 
order. It is possible, in other words, to develop a theory of interpretation that 
accounts, together, both for what are ultimately the physiological features of ju-
dicial creativeness and for the constraints to which it is subject, constraints that 
link the judge to the legislator. From this point of view, I will try to delineate 
a pragmatically oriented approach to legal interpretation. An approach of this 
kind is based on the recent contextualistic trend in  semantics, which recognize 
the necessary intervention of pragmatics, at all levels, in processes of attribution 
of meaning. On the basis of these presuppositions, it is possible to show not 
only that the process of attribution of meaning to legal dispositions cannot be 
complete without reference to the speciic pragmatical context in which the in-
terpreter is placed each time; but also that this process always takes place inside 
a set of constraints imposed by the semantic content of the starting sentence 
(the legal disposition to be interpreted).
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2 SOME OUTLINE DEFINITIONS OF A GENERAL 
CHARACTER
I am convinced that it is not possible to speak directly about legal interpreta-
tion without being prejudicially concerned to give some introductory deini-
tions of a general character, and irst of all a unitary deinition of “interpreta-
tion” encompassing the various activities that can be considered interpretative. 
Unlike the “Scuola di Genova” (and particularly Guastini10 and Chiassoni11), I 
do not believe that the peculiar features of legal interpretation can prevent us 
from tracing out a picture of a more general character also allowing us to notice 
important similarities between legal interpretation and other interpretative ac-
tivities in a sense akin to it (for example, literary criticism). Legal interpretation, 
ater all, is only one of the possible speciications of a notion of a more general 
character designating one of the most basic modalities through which we, as 
human beings, try to understand the world around us, be it the “natural world” 
or the “cultural” one.
I will now present a conceptual deinition of “interpretation”, particularly ap-
propriate to what Gallie calls essentially contested concepts12, i.e. notions struc-
turally open to discussion and susceptible to being reconstructed in quite dif-
ferent ways, all supported by “good arguments.” In all cases in which the dein-
iendum is constituted by notions of this kind, I have worked out and applied a 
model of deinition that I call conceptual deinition, whose purpose, minimal 
but not for this less important, is identifying the common conceptual basis, if 
there is any, that is to say the shared assumptions (“deemed certain”) by several 
conceptions that are diferent or even alternative to one another, referring to the 
same object13. From this point of view, the scheme that I will follow in this es-
say will have a tri-polar character: the starting point will be the general concept 
of interpretation, from which through successive speciications I will derive the 
most speciic concept of legal interpretation; secondly, from this more speciic 
concept I will derive some major conceptions of legal interpretation, those that 
have historically alternated with one another on the stage of western legal or-
ganizations since the beginning of the 19th century (when a new “legal object” 
started to take shape, namely modern law). hese conceptions, in turn, are ex-
pressed through various theories, which constitute their particular speciica-
tions, in historically determined contexts.
10 Riccardo Guastini, Nuovi studi sull’interpretazione, Roma, Aracne, 2008, 170–173.
11 Pierluigi Chiassoni, Codici interpretativi. Progetto di voce per un “vademecum” giuridico, 
Analisi e diritto 2002-2003, 60–62 (www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/ilo/testi/). 
12 Walter B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LVI 
(1955-56), 167–198.
13 See again my book Villa 2004 (n.5), 12–20.
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For instance, the eclectic or mixed conception is one of the three major con-
ceptions that I will present in this essay. However, it can take many diferent 
shapes: I will irst present the traditional version of the eclectic theory (that of 
Hart), and then I will oppose to it my own personal reconstruction, which I call 
pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation.  
Let us now try to identify the conceptual assumption common to all the var-
ious conceptions of interpretation that have been developed in the most varied 
spheres (natural sciences, human sciences, ield of art and music, and so forth). 
It can be condensed in the following way: “interpretation is the activity through 
which meaning is attributed to any object.”
his deinition has the merit of establishing a conceptual relation between 
“interpretation” and “meaning.” A conceptual relationship is an internal relation 
between two elements, such that the two elements of the relationship are con-
ceptually connected, making it impossible to account for the one without being 
forced to consider the other14.
Well, airming the existence of this type of relationship, within interpreta-
tion, means maintaining that the relation between meaning and interpretation 
is so tight and pervasive as to lead us to believe that it is not possible conceptu-
ally to work out deinitions and theories of interpretation that are not also, nec-
essarily, deinitions and theories of meaning, and vice versa. In short, one can 
only think about the notion of meaning through the notion of interpretation, 
and vice versa. It can be said, therefore, in more general terms, that a theory of 
interpretation is also, necessarily, a theory of meaning, and vice versa. It is pre-
cisely from this point of view that we can legitimately speak of a conceptual or 
internal relation between interpretation and meaning.
From this point of view, I do not agree with what Riccardo Guastini states15, 
namely that the theory of interpretation does not need any theory of mean-
ing, not even a theory that deals with meaning in natural languages, because 
the only theory which it really needs is one that reconstructs the – absolutely 
peculiar – practice of attribution of meaning in the legal sphere. In this essay I 
will try to show, instead, that in order better to understand legal interpretation 
as a process of attribution of meaning to legal texts it is absolutely fundamental 
to understand what “attributing meaning” means, in our ield as in others; and 
understanding what “attributing meaning” means is nothing but a way of work-
ing out a theory of meaning, to be precise an anti-essentialist theory, according 
14 On the notion of “internal relation”, see Gordon P. Baker and Peter M. S. Hacker, Langua-
ge, Sense and Nonsense. A Critical Investigation into Modern heories of Language, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1984, 94–115.
15 Riccardo Guastini, Due esercizi di non-cognitivismo, Analisi e diritto 1999, 278–279 (www.
giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/ilo/testi/).
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to which meaning is not an entity or an essence to be discovered but a product 
of interpretative practices. 
he conceptual deinition of legal interpretation can be worked out on three 
diferent levels, which are set at decreasing degrees of generality. 
he irst level corresponds, actually, to the conceptual deinition given before. 
It is that very general meaning of interpretation, whereby there is interpretation 
every time meaning is attributed to any object, and that is to say every time that 
a given object communicates something to us, presenting itself as a sign or a set 
of signs to be decoded. 
On the second level we ind a more speciic sense of interpretation, which is 
of greater interest to us here, because it is what concerns all contexts in which 
interpretations of human and/or cultural facts are produced, that is to say of 
facts produced by ourselves (symphonies, novels, works of art, legal norms, in-
tentions, etc.). 
he third level represents a further speciication of the second level. Indeed, 
within the sphere constituted by interpretation of cultural facts we can distin-
guish a more speciic level, consisting in interpretation of texts. Legal interpre-
tation, in the paradigmatic sense in which it is commonly understood within 
continental legal organizations, presents itself precisely as interpretation of legal 
texts, and therefore it is set at this third level. 
3 SOME DEFINITIONS CONCERNING LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION  
Interpretation of legal texts is not, however, the only way in which, within 
the ield of legal experience, interpretations are produced; texts are not the only 
“legal objects” which can be subjected to interpretations. Here it is necessary 
to make a distinction, so as to avoid possible misunderstandings. First of all 
there is a broad meaning of legal interpretation, which concerns all interpretative 
activities that take place in the legal ield of experience. With reference to these 
activities I will use the phrase “interpretation in law.” In the ield of reference of 
this locution there are certainly interpretations of texts (for instance of legis-
lative dispositions), but there are also interpretations of “objects” that are not 
texts: for example, judges and jurists are well able to interpret behaviours too, 
as in the case of negotiatory behaviours of the parties involved in stipulating a 
contract, or in the case of customary practices (regarding which, for instance, it 
is necessary to verify the element of opinio juris ac necessitatis).
Secondly, there is a narrow sense of legal interpretation, with reference to 
which I will use the locution “interpretation of law”, which concerns interpreta-
tive activity focused on texts, an activity brought into being by jurists, judges, 
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public oicers, and so on; an activity whose object is precisely legal documents 
(for instance laws, regulations, sentences, contracts, and so forth). It is precisely 
to this type of interpretation that this essay will be devoted. 
Hence I will deal with what I have called the narrow sense of legal interpreta-
tion, to distinguish it from the broad sense (“interpretation in law”) mentioned 
above. From this point of view, we can deine, following Chiassoni, legal textual 
interpretation as “the activity that consists in determining the meaning of a dis-
position (the basic component of every legal text), deriving from it one or more 
explicit norms, accredited as legally correct interpretations of them”16.
Within textual legal interpretation, I will particularly examine what can be 
considered, in legal organizations with codiied law, as the paradigmatic in-
stance of textual legal interpretation, the interpretation of law, as it is tradition-
ally called. Its object is interpretation of legal sentences having force of law, but 
also dispositions that are part of constitutional texts. his type of activity has 
common features in all legal organizations with codiied law. 
It must be speciied here that, in accordance with the point of view that I will 
maintain in this essay, interpretation of legal dispositions is not an “optional” 
activity only carried out on some occasions, for instance only in cases in which 
ascertainment of the meaning of these dispositions raises some doubts of an in-
terpretative character. A fairly inluential theory of interpretation, which today 
still has its epigones17 and is in line with the well-known saying “in claris non it 
interpretatio”, adopts instead a very narrow sense of interpretation, according to 
which, in presence of dispositions with a clear meaning, there is no interpreta-
tion strictly speaking. However, in accordance with the deinition given above, 
I maintain that every disposition requires interpretation, from the clearest to the 
obscurest. I stress again, here, that the norm is the arrival point of an interpre-
tative process that starts from the disposition. According to my pragmatically 
oriented approach, the norm itself is expressed by an utterance of the sentence 
that contains the meaning of the disposition itself. It is a basic point of my con-
ception that there isn’t a qualitative distinction between “clear cases” (for which 
no interpretation would be needed) and “hard cases” (for which it would be 
needed). An interpretation can be considered as “clear” only ater it has been 
made18. 
Lastly, it must be added that in a pragmatically oriented conception of legal 
interpretation the pragmatic dimension – the one linked to contexts of applica-
tion and uses of norms (including both “single concrete cases”, which judges 
are competent for, and “typical cases”, which jurists are competent for) – is a 
16 Pierluigi Chiassoni, Tecnica dell’interpretazione giuridica, Bologna, Il Mulino 2007, 50.  
17 See, for instance, Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal heory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1992, 12.
18 Riccardo Guastini, Dalle fonti alle norme, Torino, Giappichelli, 1990, 80.
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necessary dimension of interpretative activity and inevitably involves all dispo-
sitions.
It must be stressed that, in accordance with the deinition proposed above, 
there is no interpretation, at least in the narrow sense accepted here, in all those 
cases in which judges create (interstitially), in a strong sense, new law, for in-
stance when there is no explicit disposition able to regulate a concrete case (in-
tegration of lacunae); nor must we consider as interpretative activities, though 
they are connected to the latter, some activities that appear as preliminary to 
interpretation in a strict sense (activities for instance, serving prejudicially to 
verify the validity of the disposition to be interpreted), or those that start from it 
(like ones, which jurists are competent for, serving for carrying out subsequent 
operations of dogmatic arrangement of the normative material interpreted). 
Undoubtedly, in a broad sense of “interpretation”, we can legitimately consider 
the activities with which implicit norms are produced norms that do not have 
a disposition as their starting point as interpretative activities. Nevertheless, in 
this text my ield of reference will be the narrow sense of legal interpretation, in 
its speciic paradigmatic instance (the interpretation of dispositions).
here is an important point that it is necessary to clarify prejudicially in 
speaking of legal interpretation seen as an activity serving to attribute meaning 
to legal sentences. In accordance with the semantic theory that I accept here 
(a theory which I will qualify later on as semantic contextualism), only utter-
ances of sentences can express a complete meaning, and precisely as expressions 
of sentences that are brought into being in given contexts. In short, it is only 
within a speciic context of use that the sentence, expressed by a given speech 
act, enacts a complete communicative message. 
his perspective is fully in harmony with ordinary language philosophy, the 
conception of analytical philosophy that is behind my work. As is well known, 
the privileged object of study of this conception is not the formalized languages 
of logic and mathematics but  the non-specialist natural languages, the ordi-
nary languages of our daily life; and hence also legal language because, as a 
technicized language19, it is suiciently similar to ordinary language. Analytical 
philosophy of ordinary language, unlike ideal language philosophy, maintains 
that ordinary language must be let “as it is”, since what appear to be its defects 
(inconsistencies, ambiguities, lacunae, and so forth) are in reality the features 
that make possible its “elastic adaptation” to the demands of daily life20.
19 In a very similar vein, Jori prefers to use the locution “linguaggio amministrato”. See Mario 
Jori, Deinizioni legislative e pragmatica giuridica, Analisi e diritto 1995, 123–124.
20 On the opposition between ordinary language philosophy and ideal language philosophy see 
Richard Rorty, Metaphilosophical Diiculties of Linguistic Philosophy. Introduction, in Ri-
chard Rorty (Ed.), he Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method, Chicago, Lon-
don, he University of Chicago Press, 1967, 7–9, 15–24; Peter F. Strawson, Construction and 
Analysis, in Alfred J. Ayer and others (Eds.), he Revolution in Philosophy, London, MacMil-
lan, 1957, 101–104.
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More particularly, an analytical philosophy of ordinary language that con-
sistently adopts a pragmatically oriented approach (as I too endeavour to do), 
conceives such language as a social practice of a linguistic-communicative type, 
a coordinated set of speech acts that constitute the proper tools for producing 
diferent types of statements (informative, prescriptive, evaluative, optative, etc., 
statements). From this point of view, it is not the sentence considered in itself 
and for itself that could express a complete semantic content, but if anything it 
is the use made of it by the speaker that produces this efect, in the sense of both 
meaning and function (language in itself, i.e. abstracting from its concrete use, 
is absolutely “inert”). When language refers to the world, its when it “says some-
thing to someone”, this reference is always mediated by linguistic use; and this 
means that there is no full reference by language to the “objects of the world” 
except inside the speciic ways in which we use such language to refer to some-
thing, for instance in order to say “true things.” his use, it needs to be stressed, 
is always manifested in a speech act, and therefore it always has a contextual 
projection. 
A last distinction has to be made in order to complete the starting categorial 
picture of our analysis, above all for the purpose of more precisely establishing 
the object I will deal with in this essay. In the deinition that I have given of 
“interpretation in a narrow sense”, i.e. of “textual legal interpretation”, we can 
already identify two diferent dimensions of interpretative activity, which it is 
now necessary to distinguish more clearly.
he irst dimension is the structural one, mentioned in the irst part of the 
deinition, when reference is made to “activity that consists in determining the 
meaning of a disposition.” From this irst point of view the object of the analysis 
is how interpretation is carried out, i.e. the type of relationship that should be 
established between “interpretation” and “meaning.” he questions which this 
analysis is made to answer, from this point of view, are the following: what does 
it mean to attribute meaning to a disposition? Does it mean discovering some-
thing existing, or does it mean creating something completely new? Or does it 
even mean bringing into being a diferent activity from the irst two (possibly a 
mixture of both)?
In this essay I will deal above all precisely with this irst proile. In developing 
this type of analysis, because of the conceptual relationship between “interpre-
tation” and “meaning”, I will necessarily have to deal with questions of theory of 
meaning, particularly in order to clarify the semantic basis of the theories that I 
criticize and the diferent basis of my own approach to interpretation. 
he second proile is highlighted in the second part of the deinition, where 
reference is made to “explicit norms, accredited as legally correct interpreta-
tions of them.” It concerns the substance of interpretative activity, and therefore, 
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for instance, the reason why, in cases in which various meanings are attributable 
to the disposition, one of them is chosen rather than another. In relation to this 
second proile, it seems appropriate to me to use the locution “theory of legal 
reasoning”. Here, as it is clear, we enter a sphere of problems that is diferent 
from the previous one, because it is a matter of facing the complex issue of the 
arguments or interpretative directives that each time are used and/or must be 
used in support of a decision. 
It is now possible to put a little order in the labels used for characterizing the 
various aspects of interpretation in a narrow sense. With reference to activity 
that deals with taking into account both proiles of this activity, it is possible to 
use the phrase “general theory of legal interpretation”, while for the irst proile 
we should speak of structural theory of legal interpretation, and for the second of 
theory of legal argumentation. For reasons of expository convenience, however, 
here, except where indicated, I will use the locution “theory of legal interpreta-
tion” to characterize the speciic object of our study, and that is to say the nar-
row notion of legal interpretation, in its structural proile.
4 THREE CONCEPTIONS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
In examining these conceptions, we assume that the historical context in 
which to place the analysis is represented by legal organizations in the western 
world, with particular attention to our own, in the time span going from the 
period in which modern codiied law came into being, at the beginning of the 
19th century, to the contemporary age. 
Well, even a leeting glance at the main theories of interpretation that have 
followed one another in this framework shows that they have mostly been 
placed at two opposite extremes, in the widespread conviction, moreover, that 
there was nothing in between. An exception, in more recent times (beginning 
from the 1960s), has come from some attempts to work out a third “middle” po-
sition, attempts that can be labelled as eclectic theories. hroughout the 19th cen-
tury and during part of the 20th century, instead, there was a sort of polarization 
of the discussion, with a clash, in an opposition oten conceived as mutually ex-
clusive, between two big blocks of theories; which, in their turn, can be included 
in two wider conceptions of interpretation. I will call the irst conception inter-
pretative formalism and the second interpretative anti-formalism. Interpretative 
formalism irst developed, at the beginning of the 19th century, through Scuola 
dell’esegesi in France and Scuola storica and Pandettistica in Germany; inter-
pretative anti-formalism originally developed in France and in Germany as a 
reaction to formalism, through three big trends: Giurisprudenza degli inrteressi, 
Giurisprudenza teleologica and Scuola del diiritto libero...
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hese two big conceptions of interpretation, formalism and anti-formalism, 
are continually encountered in modern and contemporary legal culture, in a 
very complicated interlacement in which a crisis in the one very oten makes 
way for the advent of the other. he causes of this complex vicissitude are not 
only juridical, but are also linked to the strong conditioning process caused by 
the surrounding context on the various available models of the role and func-
tion of the jurist-interpreter and the judge-interpreter; and when we speak of 
“surrounding context” we refer to elements of an institutional, socio-econom-
ic, cultural and ethical-political character, changes in which, in relation to the 
given situation in which the subject matter waiting for a legal decision inds 
itself, can provoke chain reactions in legal culture, and therefore also in the way 
of conceiving the role of interpretation. hese reactions can go in two oppo-
site directions (and can also occur simultaneously and in a conlicting way in a 
given context), that is to say can move in the direction of an attempt to oppose 
chan ges and try to safeguard the original intent of the legislator regarding the 
subjects that are undergoing a process of evolution (and in this case formalistic 
trends will prevail); or move in the direction of favouring and/or guiding these 
changes and therefore valorising the elements of discontinuity and interruption 
in relation to the original situation (and in this case anti-formalist trends will 
prevail). For instance, in a given context, there may be a change of a cultural 
character in the way of conceiving, interpreting and using a given constitution-
al text (as has happened in our country in the last few decades through what 
Guastini calls a process of costituzionalizzazione); or a change in socio-econom-
ic relationships; or, again, a change of an ethical character in the predominantly 
shared social ethic inside the given political community; and so forth.
It must also be added, from the historical point of view, that formalistic con-
ceptions take hold, generally, in periods of historical-cultural proximity to phas-
es in which a certain legal system goes through important moments of codiica-
tion, or at any rate of major juridical renewal. In these situations one can easily 
expect to ind the greatest harmony, a “common feeling”, among jurists, judges 
and legislator. Besides, jurists always participate as protagonists in these pro- 
cesses of renewal, working in close contact with the legislator, as happened in the 
case of Scuola dell’Esegesi, in which jurists helped to edit the Napoleonic Code 
in order then to submit it aterwards to interpretation. his “common feeling” 
is destined, however, to go through a crisis as the distance, historical and cul-
tural, increases in relation to the period of codiication; the socio-economic re-
ality tends to produce ever-new phenomena, possibly not contemplated by the 
existing normative framework. In short, a more and more marked separation is 
produced between “legal culture of codiication” and “present-day legal culture.” 
Just this, as can be seen, is the propitious climate for the triumph of anti-formal-
ist positions, within which it is believed that the jurist and the judge can – or 
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even must – resolve interpretative and applicative issues by directly examining 
the socio-economic reality, rather than looking at the normative system.
If we look to the relationship between interpretation and meaning, which 
constitutes the speciic ield of reference of our analysis, it is possible to give two 
deinitions of the irst two conceptions at issue. From this point of view, interpre-
tative formalism basically presupposes the thesis that, in the original versions, 
the attribution of meaning to dispositions, in its genuine sense, is the immediate 
discovery of an existing meaning, however determined; or in every case, in the 
most up-to-date versions, is the prejudicial and unproblematic recognition of a 
stable semantic nucleus, which exists prior to all adjustments linked to the vari-
ous contexts in which the disposition is applied. 
From the strictly semantic point of visit, the theory of meaning – implicitly 
– presupposed by these trends is in particular harmony with a semantic theory 
that today is prevalent (not without opposition, however), which we can qualify 
as literalism21. It is that semantic conception according to which in all spheres 
in which interpretation of texts and spoken language is practised there is a com-
plete meaning of the sentence obtained by “interpreting”, a meaning that exists 
prior to its concrete use in communication, which constitutes the object of a 
sort of “sudden action of understanding” (which, as we shall see, implies a static 
vision of interpretation); this means that elements of a pragmatical character 
(linked to the use of communication in the speech acts with which it is ex-
pressed and received) do not interact with this original semantic dimension.
By contrast, interpretative anti-formalism presupposes the thesis that the 
attri bution of meaning to a disposition, in its genuine sense, is creation of a new 
meaning. he various anti-formalist theories then tend to be diferentiated by 
the more or less increasing weight attributed to the creative element in inter-
pretation; and by the more or less decreasing weight taken on by the constraint 
represented, for the interpreter, by the starting text. he central idea, though 
expressed in diferent ways, is at all events that the decisive moment of interpre-
tation is that of the “sudden creation” of meaning in the light of the context in 
which the interpreter (but above all the judge) is situated; a context that, with all 
its variables (ethical-political ideologies present in the ield, underlying socio-
economic situations, interests at stake) represents a much stronger constraint 
than the text of the relevant dispositions for deciding the case in hand. 
From the semantic point of view, anti-formalism, in its most extreme ver-
sions, shares the thesis that the legal text taken as a starting point does not con-
stitute a major constraint for the interpreter, except as an element that, appro-
priately remodelled, intervenes ex post to justify a semantic choice made on 
other bases. What can constitute a constraint for the interpreter is represented 
21 With reference to this theory, see François Recenati, Literal Meaning, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, 3–4.
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by previous interpretations (all the more so if they are “authoritative”) of the 
sentence to be interpreted; but the meaning of the disposition, strictly speaking, 
is created, in a sort of “sudden process”, by the interpreter, on the basis of the 
constraints and indications that arise from the context. In this case too, as for 
the formalist positions, it is important to notice that these conceptions repro-
duce, though oten only implicitly, a “background” semantic conception. If we 
look carefully, we see that it has many points in common with a contemporary 
conception, today very inluential, that goes by the name of radical contextual-
ism22. his conception abandons the very notion of linguistic meaning as some-
thing that exists prior to communication-reception of the message. What exists 
prior to the single interpretative act is a sort of “collection of previous applica-
tions” of linguistic expressions in similar contexts, applications legitimized in a 
sense by the linguistic community (and therefore “authoritative” applications). 
But there are no meanings shared by speakers before the beginning of a com-
municative exchange; it is only pragmatics, in the last analysis, that decides the 
meaning of expressions and sentences. 
In order to mention eclectic theories, in their traditional version, it is neces-
sary to start from the formulation that Hart gave of them, at the beginnings of 
the 1960s, in his famous book he Concept of Law23. Hart attempts to mediate 
between the two opposing conceptions of formalism and anti-formalism: in-
terpretation is substantially situated both in the dimension of discovery and in 
that of creation, but always in an alternative key. Indeed, Hart says that in some 
cases (“easy cases”) the dimension of discovery is present in interpretation, in an 
exclusive way, while in other cases (“hard cases”), always in an exclusive way, 
that of creation is present. But Hart makes it very clear that the presence of the 
one excludes the presence of the other. 
An example can serve to make this position clearer. Let us suppose that a 
provision by the town council (perfectly valid) states that “it is forbidden for 
vehicles to circulate in municipal parks”, and that, at the entrance to a park that 
can certainly be classiied as a “municipal park” (there is a list of such parks), 
there is an oicer responsible for getting it respected, and hence an oicer that 
has to interpret the provision in question, so as to be able to apply it to all the 
concrete cases that can arise in the future, cases for which permission to en-
ter the park or not will depend, also and above all, on the way he interprets 
the term “vehicle.” Well, according to Hart, for a whole series of unproblematic 
concrete cases (“easy cases”), the oicer will have no particular diiculties of an 
22 For a good analysis of radical contextualism, see Claudia Bianchi, La dipendenza contestuale. 
Per una teoria pragmatica del signiicato, Napoli, ESI, 2001, 118–119, 282–283, 304–355. An 
important example of a radical contextualist position is represented by Ronald Langacker, 
Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987 (Vol. I) & 1991 
(Vol. II).
23 Hart 1994 (n. 6), ch. VIII. 
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interpretative character; these are the cases, for instance, in which the people 
that ask for permission to enter come with cars or with motorcycles. In all these 
cases, in short, according to the approach to the eclectic or mixed theory devel-
oped by Hart, the oicer-judge will discover a previously existing meaning of the 
disposition-circular, and he will easily reach the solution to the concrete case. 
Here interpretation of the general term “vehicle” lies within the nucleus of cer-
tainty. In these cases, in short, interpretative formalism would be to right speak 
of “discovery of a previously existing meaning.”
However, a whole series of other cases could arise in which the solution 
would not be so simple. Let us suppose, for instance, that a boy with a little 
pedal car asks to enter the park: this is an object that in ordinary language 
would normally be considered a vehicle, but it might not be one for the pur-
poses of the provision, if we bear in mind its rationale (which we suppose to 
be “protecting the peace and quiet and safety of the people in the garden”). he 
situation could then be more complicated if the boy’s car was “electric”, and so 
quite noisy, though not able to harm the people walking in the garden. 
Well, for Hart, in cases like this one (a “hard case”) legal norms no longer 
ofer clear guidance. he interpreter has to make a discretionary interpretative 
choice, though certainly not an arbitrary one (in that it is supported by argu-
ments), because the meaning of the term in question is found in the penumbra 
area. In the case of the “boy’s electric car” the oicer-interpreter inds himself, 
in short, having to reconcile conlicting demands (the “right to circulate freely”, 
the “right of other people not to be hampered in the exercise of their own right 
to circulate”, “the safety demand of the people in the park”, and so forth), in a 
situation in which total satisfaction of one of these demands or aims could in-
volve complete sacriice of the others. he way in which the judge will efect rec-
onciliation (mediating between the various demands) or balancing (sacriicing 
some of them to the advantage of others) will obviously determine the meaning 
that he will give to the term “vehicle”.  In other words, if the toy car is considered 
“a vehicle”, then it cannot enter the park; if, instead, it is not considered such, 
then it can enter.
In this second series of cases, for Hart, instead, interpretative anti-formalism 
would be right: the judge, in a sense, “would create new law for the concrete 
case”, though in the weak sense of a choice between one of the available inter-
pretative options for the circular in question.
Finally we have available all the ingredients of the mixed theory, as it was 
traditionally formulated by Hart. Here interpretation is both “discovery” and 
“creation”, but never both simultaneously. Interpretation discovers meanings in 
easy cases, and creates new meanings in hard cases.
In this case too it may be useful to examine this theory in the light of the 
most recent debate in contemporary semantic theory, as we have done for the 
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other two conceptions. Well, it seems to me that this mixed theory implicitly 
harks back to the most recent and sophisticated versions of literalism (syncretic 
view, indexicalism24), in which recognition of the presence of a complete mean-
ing of the sentence, existing prior to interpretation, goes hand in hand with 
admission of the necessary role of completion and enrichment (a process that 
in semantic jargon is called “saturation”25) of the meaning of the sentence itself 
through pragmatic processes. 
5 THE COMMON SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION  
OF THESE THREE CONCEPTIONS 
Over and above the speciic criticisms that can be made of each of the three 
conceptions, there is another type of criticism that is perhaps even more de-
structive for all of them, because it attacks a “background” presupposition that 
all three conceptions seem to share, despite the big diferences that also exist 
between them. I mean that, despite appearances to the contrary, these three 
approaches to interpretation are not ater all so opposite to one another in each 
respect. In actual fact, precisely according to the outlook chosen here, that of 
the necessary relation between meaning and interpretation, despite the big the-
oretical diferences between them the three conceptions – from the point of 
view of the theory of interpretation – end up sharing a certain way of conceiv-
ing the relation between the latter and the dispositions to be interpreted; it is a 
conception that, from the semantic point of view, derives from a certain view of 
“meaning” (a static vision of meaning).  
he basic point is that, within the theory of interpretation, all three concep-
tions maintain a dichotomic opposition between “discovery” and “creation”, on 
the basis of which there are no “alternatives”: either interpretation “discovers 
something” or, on the contrary, “it creates something”, but it can never do both 
things at once. From this opposition it derives, from a semantic point of view, a 
view of meaning that can be considered static.
his is a very important point, on which it is worth dwelling a little. By a 
“static vision of meaning” I mean the idea that meaning, “discovered” (formal-
ism) or “created” (anti-formalism), or “sometimes discovered” and “sometimes 
created” (eclectic theory), is at all events something that is produced “all at once”, 
in “a single solution.” Meaning, in short, is seen as an entity that is discovered 
or is produced “all together” and not, as I will maintain soon, as the result of a 
24 A good analysis of both theories can be found in Recenati 2004 (n. 21), 51–53. 85–89. An 
important indexicalist position is represented by Jason Stanely, Language in Context. Selected 
Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
25 On this notion see again Recenati 2004 (n. 21), 7 f. 
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dynamic process “in several phases.” Besides, it is precisely the lack of a dynamic 
vision of interpretation, “in diferent stages”, that precludes the possibility of 
proposing a conception that simultaneously bears both dimensions in mind. 
Let us return, however, to the static vision of meaning and the way in which 
it is expressed by the three traditional conceptions. he fact is that if one be-
lieves that meaning is discovered, then this “entity” is considered as existing 
prior to interpretative activity (formalism); if instead one believes that it is cre-
ated from scratch in interpretation, then the entity in question is considered 
as entirely produced by the interpreter (anti-formalism). Not even the mixed 
theory, in its traditional version, can escape this formulation: it limits itself to 
dichotomically distinguishing cases in which meaning is discovered from cases 
in which it is created.
 I am convinced that none of these three approaches is able adequately to 
account for the truly peculiar aspect of legal interpretation (but also of inter-
pretation in general), that, as Dworkin appropriately reminds us, is represented 
by the simultaneous presence of both elements, “discovery” and “creation”26. In 
my opinion, precisely this is the really interesting and characteristic aspect of 
interpretative activity, above all when it deals with texts (as legal interpretation 
and literary criticism).
his “static” semantic presupposition represents the true weak point that 
is common to formalism, anti-formalism and the mixed theory deriving from 
Hart. his proile of the conception of meaning does not allow these concep-
tions to explain adequately what, as I have said above, is the inalienable pecu-
liarity of interpretative activity, concerning the impossibility of its being totally 
reduced either to the modality of discovery or to that of creation. Interpretative 
activity, in actual fact, participates of both modalities, through a dynamic process 
of attribution of meaning to dispositions, a process that therefore goes through 
several phases and touches on both the dimension of discovery and that of crea-
tion. It is precisely this aspect of interpretative activity that is not taken into 
account by the traditional perspectives.
In order to illuminate in a complete way this important proile of interpreta-
tion, my proposal, which I will develop in the next section, will be to pass from 
a static approach to a dynamic approach to the theory of meaning (and, accord-
ingly, to the theory of interpretation). To do this, however, it will be necessary 
to look at meaning in a diferent way from how it is shaped by the approaches 
already examined; and this means attributing to this notion three particular 
features, which the traditional conceptions do not bother to highlight. It is 
necessary, that is, to build the notion of “meaning” as a notion that appears as 
stratiied (in the sense that it contains diferent levels), inclusive (it includes both 
26 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, 
146–147.
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sense and reference) and as having a progressive formation (in the sense that the 
attribution of meaning is a “process in several phases”). Hence, from this point 
of view, two basic ideas of this new perspective are, irst of all, that meaning 
is not produced “all at once”, but constitutes the result of a process that goes 
through several phases, or at any rate of a process that can be analytically distin-
guished into several phases (though from the psychological point of view this 
process may even last just an instant in the interpreter’s mind); and, secondly, 
that in this process the meaning of a disposition tends to be progressively speci-
ied, as soon as it comes into contact with concrete application situations (in the 
case of the judge), or with “typical cases” (in the case of the jurist). 
he locution “sequential monism” can certainly serve to give an adequate 
denomination to my perspective, a further denomination in respect of the de-
nomination “pragmatically oriented”, which I will introduce in the next section. 
Indeed, deining the theory as monistic renders fairly well the idea that in the 
interpretative process the meaning of the disposition (as we shall see) tends to 
be speciied in a process that however remains unitary, because it starts from a 
common semantic basis; adding the attribute “sequential” appropriately high-
lights, instead, the fact that this meaning, as the interpretation process develops, 
goes through several phases, reaching higher and higher levels of speciication 
and concretization. his speciication process, it must be stressed, can take dif-
ferent paths, and therefore branch out in several directions, also alternative 
ones.
It is precisely through an analytical breakdown of this process of progressive 
formation of meaning into several phases that one succeeds in dissipating the 
air of inconsistency that a dynamic vision might provoke, precisely in that it 
might seem that this vision invokes the simultaneous presence, in interpreta-
tion, of an activity of “discovery” and an activity of “creation.” As we shall see in 
the next sections, instead, the pragmatically oriented theory succeeds in avoid-
ing this type of criticism (which would be destructive), just because it denies 
the presence, at the same moment, of both phases, and instead recognizes that 
there are some phases of the process of attribution of meaning that belong to 
the dimension of discovery, while there are other phases that belong to the di-
mension of creation.
6 THE CONDITIONS FOR A PRAGMATICALLY 
ORIENTED THEORY OF MEANING 
In this section and the next I will endeavour to distance myself clearly from 
a static approach to meaning, and I will do so by developing an alternative se-
mantic theory of a dynamic character, which I will apply to legal interpretation. 
he result will be an eclectic or mixed theory of legal interpretation, a theory, 
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however, that is meant as an alternative to the traditional eclectic theories. In 
this section I will deal with the question of what the conditions must be that 
a theory of meaning for legal interpretation has to satisfy. In the next one, in-
stead, I will try to specify the main features that such a theory has.
In the irst place, a theory of meaning serving our purposes cannot only be 
a theory that is adequate from the general semantic point of view, but also has 
to be appropriate for legal interpretation. For this purpose, it is thus necessary 
to render prejudicially explicit a series of conditions that a theory of meaning 
has to satisfy (from both the semantic and the legal point of view), if it wants to 
be considered an acceptable candidate for acting as a semantic reference model 
for the theory of legal interpretation. I will now present those that I consider the 
necessary conditions to be satisied. 
he irst basic condition for the semantic theory to be such a model is full 
recognition of the conceptual relationship existing between meaning and in-
terpretation, and thus of the need for the theory of interpretation expressly to 
adopt a theory of meaning as a reference point for a reconstructive investigation, 
normatively oriented, of the interpretative practices brought into being in the 
contexts that we have chosen as the sphere of investigation (and speciically for 
the context represented by our legal organization). 
he second condition is that the theory of meaning adopted should be not 
only satisfactory from the point of view of general semantic theory but also 
particularly appropriate in accounting for the marked peculiarities of legal lan-
guage and interpretative activity making reference to it. his means, irst of all: 
i) that the aforesaid theory of the meaning must take into account the fact that 
this language has a prescriptive character, and therefore has a diferent func-
tion from that of informative language, on which semantic theories are nor-
mally modelled; ii) that such language is distanced by some of its characteristics 
from ordinary language, which constitutes the reference basis for contextualistic 
theories of meaning, which I look at with particular attention; iii) that legal lan-
guage is in any case diferent from conversational language, in which there are 
expressed the communicative messages of daily life, these being the object of al-
most exclusive attention on the part of the contextualistic theories themselves.
In relation to this second condition we have touched on an important point, 
on which it is worth dwelling for a moment. So far we have used without partic-
ular cautions the word “context”, although it represents an extremely important 
element of contemporary semantic conceptions, by which the present text is 
inspired (contextualistic conceptions, precisely). he moment has come to give 
a more precise deinition of this notion, a deinition tailored for legal interpreta-
tion. Well, from this point of view, “context” means that set of aspects, precise 
and identiiable ones, of the situation (irst of all certain speciic spatio-tem-
poral coordinates), in which each time the person who receives the normative 
109
revija za evropsko ustavnost
A Pragmatically Oriented Theor y of Legal Interpretation
(2010) 12
www.revus.eu
message (the interpreter-jurist and the interpreter-judge) is placed. It is worth 
specifying that when we speak of “situation” we want to encompass both the 
speciic concrete situation in which each time the judge is placed in deciding a 
single case, and a situation that is even only hypothesized, typiied or constructed 
as a conceptual experiment by the jurist-interpreter. 
We spoke before about the important diferences between conversational in-
terpretation and legal interpretation. hese diferences, however, are not such 
as to render impracticable the use of contextualistic perspectives as a semantic 
basis for a theory of meaning tailored for legal interpretation. Much of what 
contextualism maintains on the subject of the “meaning of the speaker” can 
very well be applied to the “meaning of the receiver” or to the meaning of the 
“receiver of the message.” For contextualism, it is true, all speech acts are sen-
sitive to the context. In the case of legal interpretation, however, we have to 
turn to the sensitivity  of the context in which the “receiver” of the message is 
placed (the interpreter-jurist or the interpreter-judge), and not the sender (the 
legislator)27. 
he third condition particularly concerns one of the points mentioned in con-
nection with the second condition, that is to say the fact that legal language is a 
prescriptive language, while contextualistic semantic theories take informative 
(or “descriptive”) language as the privileged reference basis for their analyses. 
Well, in order to apply this semantic theory to legal language, we must be able to 
maintain that the problems connected to the semantic content of sentences are 
not so diferent if we pass from sentences with an informative function (asser-
tions) to those with a prescriptive function (directives). To maintain this, in my 
opinion it is also absolutely necessary to share the thesis according to which the 
diference between an assertion and a directive that exhibit the same semantic 
content does not lie in the content itself (which some call phrastic28, but which 
I will call argument), but in the pragmatic function performed (in one case, 
informative function, in the other, prescriptive function); and maintaining this 
means airming, in other words, that a prescriptive meaning strictly speaking 
does not exist29. he same content of meaning can be modulated pragmatically 
27 Francesca Poggi suitably underscores this point. See Francesca Poggi, Contesto e signiica-
to letterale, Analisi e diritto 2006-2007, 196–203 (www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/ilo/
testi/). 
28 Here the obvious reference is to Richard Hare, he Language of Morals, London, Oxford Uni-
versity Press; it. transl. Il linguaggio della morale, Roma, Ubaldini, 1968, 28–32.
29 his is a thesis which many analytical philosophers (Strawson, Searle, Dummett, Kerner, Plat-
ts, etc.) share, even if they reconstruct it in diferent ways. heir common point of departure, 
at least on this speciic point, is represented by Austin’s work . See, for instance, John L. Austin, 
Philosophical Papers (1961), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, 248–251. But see also Mi-
chael Dummett, Seas of Language, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, 122–123, and Mark Platts, 
Ways of Meaning. An Introduction to Philosophy of Language, London, Routledge & Kegan, 
1979, 43.
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as an assertion or as a directive, according to the type of speech act performed. 
In legal theory, it is the expressive conception of norms30, among other theories, 
which follows this kind of approach.
he fourth and last condition for building a theory of meaning “tailored” for 
legal interpretation concerns the way of conceiving “meaning”, and, more spe-
ciically, the question of whether it could be exclusively seen in intra-linguistic 
terms (in my lexicon, only as sense), as internalistic conceptions require; or in 
exclusively extra-linguistic terms, that is in terms of “language-world” relation-
ship (in my lexicon, only as reference), as externalistic conceptions require; or, 
again, whether it is to be conceived including both dimensions (sense and refer-
ence) in meaning. his point will be treated in the next section, on the subject of 
the features of the pragmatically oriented theory.
7 THE FEATURES OF A PRAGMATICALLY ORIENTED 
THEORY
I will now delineate the basic features of a pragmatically oriented theory 
of meaning tailored for legal interpretation; which also means, because of the 
conceptual connection that exists between “interpretation” and “meaning”, de-
lineating the features of a pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation.
he irst thing to be done is to clarify the sense in which I use the locution 
“pragmatically oriented”31. his locution is meant to highlight an important as-
pect of this theory, and precisely that of the need, always and in all cases, for 
interpretative activity to be produced in a context (in the sense previously given 
to this expression); in the absence of this, one cannot speak of construction of a 
complete meaning of the disposition to be interpreted. In short, it is pragmatics, 
as a discipline that studies the efects and contexts of communication, to give a 
necessary marching direction to semantics, as a discipline that studies the con-
ventional meanings of words. 
In a pragmatically oriented theory of meaning, the role of the context is dou-
ble: there is a context that we can call “distal” or “background”, which is rep-
resented by that reservoir of basic pieces of information on natural facts (for 
instance, on certain laws of nature) and cultural ones (for instance, on the pres-
ence of certain institutions and certain social habits), of shared practices on 
how to do “certain things correctly”, and so forth, which are commonly shared 
30 For this conception, see, for instance, Eugenio Bulygin, Norms and Logic. Kelsen and Wein-
berger on the Ontology of Norms, Law and Philosophy 4 (1985) 2, 146–148.
31 he locution “pragmatically oriented theory” is used also by Dascal and Wróblewski in a quite 
similar way. See Marcelo Dascal and Jerzy Wróblewski, Transparency and Doubt: Understan-
ding and Interpretation in Pragmatics and in Law, Law and Philosophy 7 (1988) 2, 203–224.
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by the competent members – even minimally – of a certain linguistic commu-
nity, and which help to ix some stable meanings in the airmations that we 
make32. If, for instance, I tell my servant “to cut the grass”, the servant, at least 
in normal cases, understands without any doubt, on the basis of these back-
ground assumptions, that the way in which the grass is to be cut (for instance, 
with a mower) is not the same as the way in which “a wool thread is cut” (with 
scissors); and he understands this even if there is nothing, in the conventional 
meaning of “cut” incorporated in my airmation, pushing him in the irst di-
rection rather than in the second. It would be suicient, however, to change 
this “ordinary  background context” for the expression in question to take on 
a diferent meaning, which can also be done (and contextualist philosophers of 
language do it) through “conceptual experiments” serving to change, possibly 
in an eccentric way, some elements of the background context. If, to continue 
with the same example, I say to a person “cut the grass” in a context in which 
the earth is by now devoid of lawns, so that there only remain small and slender 
tuts to be cut carefully with a pair of scissors (to preserve them), then the locu-
tion “cut the grass” would contextually have a diferent meaning.
he gist of these considerations can be summed up as follows: “there are 
never expressions and airmations that are completely decontextualized; with-
out reference contexts and speech acts the words that we pronounce and write 
remain completely inert.”
In addition to distal context, there is a second sense of context, which I have 
already introduced in the previous chapter, also using the expression “situation-
al context”, and which some philosophers of language call “proximal context.” 
It concerns the “precise, local and identiiable aspects” that the receiver of the 
communicative message must bring into play in order to attribute a complete 
meaning to sentences33.
In the example of “vehicles in the park”, it is only through concrete, real or 
imagined, situations that the expression “vehicle” is given a complete meaning 
within the speech act producing the utterance expressing that given sentence in 
a contextually determined way, also settling any doubts on the identiication of 
single objects as being part or not of the “class of vehicles” (“is the pedal car a 
vehicle or not?”).
It is worth stressing, to conclude these considerations, that from the point of 
view of this theory the complete meaning of a sentence can only be produced 
32 For a well known analysis of the background context, see John Searle, Expression and Meaning. 
Studies in the heory of Speech, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, 117–131, and 
John Searle, he Background of Meaning, in ed. by John Searle, Ferenc Kiefer and Manfred 
Bierwisch (Eds.), Speech Act heory and Pragmatics, Dordrecht, Springer, 1980, 221–232.  
33 On the diference between distal context and proximal context, see Bianchi 2001 (n. 22), 268–
271. 
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through the combined intervention of the distal context and the proximal con-
text. Before this we only have, as starting basis, semantic frames or schemata of 
meaning, and that is to say the conventional meanings of the single expressions 
contained in the sentence, which constitute the framework of what we want 
to say, a space of signiication that also represents a major constraint for the 
process of speciication and concretization that will lead to the complete mean-
ing. But, as I have said, the complete meaning is only given through the single 
speech act that produces an utterance of the sentence by contextualizing it.
Let us now try to delineate three basic features of this approach to meaning. 
First, however, it is necessary to say something else about an even more general 
characterization that we have attributed to this theory when, in contrasting it 
with the static approach, we characterized it as dynamic. In this sense, it must 
be speciied that this theory looks at the process of linguistic communication as 
the fundamental dimension to refer to in order to understand the notion of 
meaning; thus it is a conception that addresses irst of all the subjects of the 
communication (senders and receivers); secondly, but even more importantly, it 
addresses the context in which this communication is participated in. From this 
point of view, meaning is not placed either in an abstract and timeless logical 
dimension or in a psychological or mental dimension, as if it were a tertium quid 
between the language used for communicating and the objects it speaks about. 
In meaning, as we will see more clearly aterwards, both dimensions of the 
processes of linguistic communication coexist: the linguistic tool used (sense) 
and the objects referred to in communication itself (reference).
What I have said implies a particular coniguration of the theory of mean-
ing. According to this coniguration, the objective of this theory is not to de-
scribe and explain, statically, the entity “meaning”, with its properties, but to 
account, dynamically, for a set of skills and competences linked to the production, 
understanding and interpretation of meanings34. It is evident that in a pragmati-
cally oriented perspective it is the dynamic dimension, related to the investiga-
tion of how meanings arise and/or how they are attributed, that has precedence 
over the static dimension, related to the investigation of the nature of meaning 
(the “what is” of meaning); it is the second dimension, in a sense, that depends 
on the irst35. 
On the basis of what has just been said, it can be airmed that this theory 
endeavours to overcome the artiicial dichotomy that exists, in the traditional 
34 Michael Dummett highlights very well this thesis. See Michael Dummett, What is a heory 
of Meaning? (II), in Gareth Evans and John McDowell (Eds.), Truth and Meaning. Essays in 
Semantics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976, 69–72. See also Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of 
Words, Harvard, Harvard  University Press, 1989, 25 f.
35 For a quite recent pragmatic approach, of a general character, to philosophy of language, see 
Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit. Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994.
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conceptions of legal interpretation, between “discovering” and “creating”, a di-
chotomy that none of the three conceptions examined in the previous chap-
ter really challenges. he basic idea behind this proposal is that in a dynamic 
theory of meaning it is possible to maintain the very reasonable thesis that legal 
interpretation is a “mixture of discovery and creation.” his can be done in an 
absolutely consistent way because the dimension of discovery and that of crea-
tion are both present, it is true, in the process of attribution of meaning, but not 
simultaneously; rather in diferent phases, and that is to say in one or the other 
of the diferent phases (which we will study in the continuation of the chapter) 
in which this process is articulated, precisely, dynamically. 
From the dynamic approach delineated above there derive three basic fea-
tures that must be assigned to the notion of meaning and that are particularly 
appropriate to the theory of legal interpretation. 
Firstly, the notion of meaning is a stratiied notion, which is articulated on 
several diferent levels36; secondly, it is an inclusive notion, which comprises 
both the internal intra-linguistic dimension (sense) and the dimension of the 
“language-world” relationship (reference); thirdly, it is a notion which implies 
progressive formation of meaning, that is a meaning which is not produced “all 
at once” but through a complex process that contains several phases37.
In this section we will deal with the irst thesis, in the next section with the 
second one, and in the inal  section with the third one. It’s time, now, to distin-
guish three layers of meaning: meaning in a broad sense, meaning in a narrow 
sense and meaning in a weak sense. 
At the irst level of this notion there is what we can call meaning in a broad 
sense, that is to say the general meaning of the sentence interpreted (because, 
as we have said, there is no complete meaning before interpretation), seen as an 
instrument with which to communicate something determined. Hence in this 
irst layer “meaning” has to be seen as the autonomous quantum of communica-
tion that is inferable through interpretation from the sentence38. With this dei-
nition I make reference to everything that is communicated in the message con-
tained in the sentence. he important thing to notice is that at this very general 
36 hat meaning has many dimensions or layers is a thesis widely shared in the analytic philo-
sophy of language. See, for instance, Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Phi-
losophy of Science, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1980, 113, and Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language 
and Reality. Philosophical Papers. Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, 246, 
268–269. In this essay, however, I follow particularly the scheme presented by Ruth Kempson, 
Semantic heory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, 11 f.
37 Mauro Barberis, among others, agrees with this thesis. See Mauro Barberis, Il sacro testo. 
L’interpretazizne giuridica fra ermeneutica e pragmatica, Ars interpretandi 1999, 282–289. 
38 See Giovanni Tarello, Diritto, enunciati, usi: studi di teoria e metateoria del diritto, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, 1974, 146.
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level the meaning of the sentence, in the sense of the complete communicative 
message expressed by it, also includes the function.
At the second level there is meaning in a narrow sense, that is to say the topic 
of the sentence, its semantic content which is inferred through interpretation, 
putting in brackets the element, of a pragmatic nature, relating to the function. 
In this second dimension it is necessary, as we have already said, clearly to sepa-
rate meaning and function. It is here, in short, that the two things must be kept 
separate: meaning in the narrow sense (as topic) must be considered as inde-
pendent of the function – though in a sense correlated to the latter. 
he third level of meaning is represented by meaning in a weak sense, that is 
to say by the meaning of single words, and of the notions connotated by them: 
words and notions that help us to produce, through the interpretative activity, a 
complete meaning (perhaps one of the many possible meanings) of a sentence 
(in our case of a legal sentence). his third layer of meaning is called “weak” 
because it is wholly evident that the meaning of the single words, before an 
interpretative process is activated, does not express a complete communicative 
message. his does not mean, however, that the single expressions contained in 
sentences do not have any meaning. hey have, as we will see, basic conventional 
meanings, as they result from the linguistic conventions adopted in a given lan-
guage, and as, accordingly, they are encoded in dictionaries. hese weak mean-
ings represent the common linguistic background of the competent speakers of 
a natural language (and of a technicized language like legal language). It is dif-
icult to imagine speakers of a language understanding one another and com-
municating together without possessing this common background; without it 
communicating would always be a “leap in the dark.”
In our example, the word “vehicle” used in the circular has a weak basic 
meaning that corresponds, by and large, to what we can ind in a dictionary un-
der the entry referring to the word in question: what we would ind, in short, is 
a sort of a basic deinition running like this: «a vehicle is a self-propelled object, 
with wheels, able to transport people or things»; and also, possibly, some image 
representing that class of objects (the image of a motorcar, for instance).  
It is important to stress that the words that most interest legal interpretation 
are conigurable as general descriptive terms39. “Vehicle” is one of these words; 
but the same could also be said of more complex constructions like the phrase 
“country estate”, or those requiring an evaluative intervention, like “common 
sense of decency”.  It is important to specify that the general descriptive terms 
connote classes or notions, and therefore have a range that contains more than 
one single object. 
39 Tarello 1974 (n. 38), 223. 
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8 SENSE AND REFERENCE
I will distinguish, within meaning in a weak sense, the two dimensions of 
sense and reference. In this way, as I have said before, I will introduce an inclu-
sive notion40, of a dualistic type, of meaning of single words. As I have said, it is 
a conception that distinguishes two components of this layer of meaning that 
are autonomous (though between them there is a relationship of mutual inter-
action), components that will be analysed aterwards, though in a very brief 
and schematic form: i) sense, which concerns the intra-linguistic dimension of 
meaning, and skills and competences (the capacity to understand and speak 
a language) connected to it; ii) reference, which concerns the relationships be-
tween language and reality and the connected skills and competences related to 
the connection between language and world (in the case in which reference is 
made by general terms, of kind, of class, and so forth).
It is extremely important, for the theory of legal interpretation, to maintain 
an inclusive approach to the theory of meaning. Such an approach, in the limits 
within which it recognizes the –partial – autonomy of the dimension of sense, 
makes it possible to reconstruct in a semantic key the complex interpretative 
operations that jurists carry out when they work on the terms used by the leg-
islator, exploring their systemic connections with other terms in legislative lan-
guage and building up a complex network of legal notions; but it also makes it 
possible, in the limits within which the dimension of reference is inserted in 
that of meaning, to avoid any break between this “internal” work and the rela-
tionship with concrete cases (or more exactly with reference to the objects and 
events that characterize concrete cases). Moreover, adopting an inclusive con-
ception of meaning allows one to attain some important results, in the theory 
of interpretation, which here, due to lack of space, can only be mentioned. he 
fact is that it makes it possible, irst of all, to recognize that there is no clear-cut 
distinction between “interpretazione dottrinale” (performed by jurists) and “in-
terpretazione operativa” (performed by judges), but if anything a strong basic 
homogeneity; and it makes it possible, secondly, to avoid any strong conceptual 
break between interpretation and application of law, activities that can be seen 
as two phases of a single process, at least if it is reconstructed in a semantic 
key.  
A useful starting point for understanding more clearly the distinction be-
tween these two dimensions of meaning is to try to imagine two diferent types 
of possible questions that, even at the level of ordinary language, can be asked 
regarding the meaning of a word or a notion connotated by the word. Intuitively 
it is easy to realize that they are two diferent questions, which arouse two types 
of diferent issues.
40 he word “inclusive”, with reference to theory of meaning, is used by Hesse 1980 (n. 36), 
113. 
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 he irst question concerns, precisely, the sense of a word or a notion, and 
can be formulated as follows: “what is the meaning of  that word or notion?” 
he second question, instead, concerns the reference of the word or the notion, 
and can be formulated as follows: “what does that word or notion refer to?”
I will begin my short analysis from sense. According to the pragmatic and 
dynamic vision of language as an instrument of communication, and with the 
vision of meaning as a product of interpretation, my investigation on sense will 
take as a basic thematic node not the issue of “what is that entity called sense?”, 
possibly mediating between thought and reality, that is to say between language 
and objects (in the traditional vision, of a static type, of meaning and interpreta-
tion); but instead the issue of “what does it mean to understand the sense of a 
word or a notion?”. 
Well, “understanding the sense of these linguistic entities” means exhibiting 
a peculiar competence, both at the level of langue (the natural language cur-
rently spoken inside that community) and at the level of langage. Let us now 
seek to distinguish these two proiles a little more clearly.
 “Understanding the sense”, on the langue side, means expressing the ability 
correctly to use the words of a language, in the presupposition, obviously, that 
their meaning is known, from the point of view of the notions – of the language 
– connotated by them; that is to say, it means being able to operate correctly the 
appropriate substitutions of the words whose meaning is not known, through 
the insertion of synonyms with a known meaning. Let us think, for instance, of a 
foreigner who does not understand the sentence “Mario is a bachelor” because 
he or she does not know the meaning of the word “bachelor” in that langue; 
here the explanation of the sense consists, then, in the substitution of the word 
in question with a synonymous word or phrase (“not married”), whose sense is 
instead known.  
“Understanding the sense”, on the language side, means being able to master 
(oten in an implicit way) and/or produce a whole series of assumptions per-
taining to the features and properties of the objects that are part of the sphere of 
extension of the general terms, assumptions that constitute the outcome of the 
intervention of deinitions, of various types, of the terms themselves. hese are 
assumptions that can i) concern the initial phase of interpretation, in the case 
in which they represent the stable conceptual base (concepts, stereotypes) on 
which the employment of the terms being deined are founded; ii) or concern 
the inal phase of interpretation in the case in which they help to determine the 
complete notions connoted by the terms themselves. It is clearly this second pro-
ile that interests legal interpretation. 
Let us return to our favourite example, represented by the circular on “vehi-
cles”, to ask ourselves what the basic conditions are for qualifying the “oicer-
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interpreter” as a linguistically competent member of his legal community. Here 
it is suicient to limit ourselves to the second type of conditions, those that 
concern the level of legal language. he oicer will prove to be a linguistically 
competent member of the legal community insofar as he is able, irst of all, to 
identify the stable conceptual base of the notion of vehicle (relying, for instance, 
on the assumption, previously mentioned, that “a vehicle is a means of trans-
port for people or things, especially mechanical and driven by man”); and, in 
the second place (in relation to a possible concrete case constituted by a “toy 
car”, driven by a child), to build a possible complete sense of the same notion, 
attributing determined coordinates to its ield of extension (coordinates traced 
out, among other things, on the basis of the assumption that “a vehicle is a me-
chanical means of transport able to produce noises and to provoke damage to 
things or people”). Obviously this attribution of sense would justify his taking 
the decision to allow the “toy car” to enter the municipal garden. 
Let us now move on to reference. On the subject of reference, what the per-
son receiving the communicative message wants to know is: “what objects is the 
person communicating this message to me speaking about?” Hence this notion 
indicates the objects – existing, in some sense, in reality – which our words may 
refer to.
For the notion of reference, too, we will adopt the dynamic and pragmati-
cally oriented approach to meaning and interpretation that we have used all 
through this essay. In this sense, the problem of the coniguration of the refer-
ence of general terms is no longer linked to the question “what is reference?”, 
but, instead, to the question “how is reference acquired and/or attributed?” 
Within this type of formulation, the irst important thing to be clariied is that 
the activity of identifying reference can be distinguished into three diferent 
phases, which we will now examine. 
he irst phase of this process is identiication or recognition of paradigmatic 
cases. It is the phase that concerns the recognition of the paradigmatic value of 
some concrete instances of the class connoted by the general term involved, that 
is to say the recognition that some single “exemplary” objects certainly belong 
to the ield of reference of the term. In our example, “cars” certainly constitute 
paradigmatic cases of the notion of “vehicle”, recognized as such by the oicer-
interpreter, as a linguistically competent member of the legal community.
he second phase is identiication of the set of objects denoted by the term. It 
is the phase in which we are concerned to establish a possible sphere of exten-
sion of the term, that is to say to determine a possible class of objects to which 
it is applicable. It is important to specify that the ield of reference, in a concep-
tion of a contextualistic type, is not considered as intrinsically connected to the 
use of the term, but rather as susceptible of being reconstructed in diferent 
ways, in relation to the intervention of a large series of variables (the context is 
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“inexhaustible”41); and these variables, in the case of legal terms, are connect-
ed above all both to the general course of the interpretation of the disposition 
which the terms are part of (the whole complex of “textual” and “extra-textual” 
elements - purpose of the disposition, principles underlying it, and so forth - 
serving to orient it); and to needs of an applicative character, which concern 
the feature of concrete situations, or of typical situation that the disposition is 
concerned to regulate.  
What does it mean to construct a – possible – ield of extension of a gen-
eral term? his operation consists in an extensional broadening of the semantic 
area of the term, a broadening that unfolds through a process that moves from 
the cases recognized at that time as clear, regarding which there is no doubt 
about their belonging to the class (the paradigmatic cases), to the doubtful cases, 
whose belonging is more uncertain. he positive result of this process depends 
on the degree of similarity, if any, that is found between the two series of cases; 
and the importance of this similarity for the cases at issue naturally has to be ap-
praised (and depends, in turn, on the results that one wishes to reach through 
the interpretation and application procedure).
he third phase is identiication of a single object that is part of the sphere of 
extension of the notion. It is the terminal phase, from a logical point of view, of the 
process of attribution of reference, which consists in recognizing or otherwise, 
in a speciic concrete object, the member quality, to all intents and purposes, of 
the class connoted by the term. he result, positive or negative, of the operation 
of recognition depends on how the similarities, if any, between the single con-
crete object and the normal members of the class are evaluated, naturally on the 
basis of the preventive selection of the similarities deemed important. 
he phase of identiication of reference, if it is set in the sphere of legal inter-
pretation, particularly concerns the moment of application of the law, the phase 
in which the judge applies the general norm, in an interpretation he makes, to 
the concrete case.
9 THE PROGRESSIVE FORMATION OF MEANING
As I have said before, the third proile of a pragmatically oriented theory of 
meaning is constituted by the thesis that the attribution of meaning to a sen-
tence, and more speciically, in the case that interests us most, to a legal disposi-
tion, is a process in several phases, during which the semantic framework of the 
41 Charles Travis has many times underscored this very important feature of context. See, for 
instance, Charles Travis, Pragmatics, in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (Eds.), A Companion to 
the Philosophy of Language (1997), Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, 87–102. 
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disposition is progressively speciied, in contact with concrete cases or typical 
cases, until, through the act of utterance, a complete meaning is produced.
hese various phases can usefully be linked to two big dimensions, the con-
ventional dimension and the contextual dimension42, the presence of which al-
lows us to reach a result which is important for us: that of conceptually separat-
ing, in legal interpretation, the element of discovery (conventional dimension) 
and that of creation (contextual dimension). In this way we can account for the 
idea, which intuitively appears persuasive, that the peculiarity of interpretation 
consists in a “mixture of discovery and creation”, but without incurring in con-
tradictory airmations, which instead would happen if we maintained that dis-
covery and creation are activities that are brought into being simultaneously in 
the same phase.
he dynamic vision of meaning, as we has said, involves the idea that mean-
ing is a notion with progressive formation: that is to say, it is formed by degrees, 
passing through various phases (and therefore through progressive speciica-
tion of the semantic content of the disposition in question), and not “all at once” 
(whether it is for discovery or creation). hese phases, which as we know are 
distinguishable into two (but will then be broken down into several “sub-phas-
es”), are both to be considered necessary passages for the construction of the 
overall meaning of the sentence.
In this process, divided into several phases, the conventional meaning (of 
the single expressions) is at the start of the activity of attribution of meaning 
to a disposition, constituting the shared starting basis (the “common semantic 
background” – for instance, concepts and paradigmatic cases – that the send-
ers and receivers of the message do not question for the moment), while the 
contextual meaning is in the second phase of the process, which moves towards 
the objective of construction of a fully speciied meaning, an objective that is 
attained whenever a concrete communicative interaction takes place.
he fact remains, however, that the inal moment of complete construction 
of meaning of a disposition, by legal interpretation, is that of its deinitive se-
mantic speciication (very oten one among the various possible ones) in the 
various contexts of reception in which there is placed, each time, the normative 
message expressed by the disposition itself. 
In a dynamic vision of meaning that is fully articulated, it is not suicient to 
distinguish the two dimensions of conventional meaning and contextual mean-
ing; it is also necessary to isolate the various speciic phases of the process of 
progressive formation of meaning, which are part, alternatively, either of the 
irst or of the second dimension. Only by taking these various phases into ac-
42 It is important to stress that, from a dynamic perspective, there is no opposition between 
these two dimensions. See, on this thesis, Kempson 1977 (n. 36), 5. 
120
revija za evropsko ustavnost
JUDICAL LAW MAKING
(2010) 12
www.revus.eu
count in detail we can have a clearer idea of how the process of attribution of 
meaning to legal dispositions concretely works. Unfortunately is not possible 
here, for reasons of space, to examine in detail this articulation of interpretative 
activity into phases. I can only make a brief mention. 
Let us consider the attribution of sense. Putting it very schematically, it goes 
through two phases: the irst one, which concerns the recognition of the pres-
ence of the concept (the common semantic bases of a pathway that can lead to 
several complete notions), belongs to the conventional dimension; the second, 
which concerns the construction of the complete notion, belongs to the contex-
tual dimension.
Let us now consider attribution of reference. Summing it up, it can be said 
the this process goes through three phases: the irst one, which concerns the 
identiication of paradigmatic cases, belongs to the conventional dimension; the 
second, which concerns the construction of a possible ield of extension of the 
notion, belongs to the contextual dimension, like the third one, which regards 
the identiication of a single object as belonging to the ield of extension of the 
notion.
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